We analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent (i.e., upstream monopoly). In so doing, we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration. First, we base industry structurenamely, the ownership of assets -firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries. Second, we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified non-cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly. Given this, we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. We also consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in manner that cannot be achieved under non-integration. We demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition. Our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and, depending upon the strength of downstream competition (i.e., product differentiation), the opposite could easily be the case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: L42
Introduction
There are long-standing antitrust concerns about potential social detriment from vertical integration, centering on integration by an upstream monopoly into the downstream segment. The monopolist may restrict supply after integration and foreclose on downstream rivals, or it may appropriate more of the rents at the expense of downstream firms. Moreover, there is a general belief that improving competition in the bottleneck segment would alleviate these concerns. 1 There are two ways that competition might serve to discourage socially harmful vertical integration. First, upstream competitors will respond to attempts by a firm to foreclose on rivals by expanding their supply to the downstream. Thus, a firm facing competition will not be able to use vertical integration to raise prices in the industry.
Second, it is claimed that competition reduces any bargaining power conferred on the monopolist by integration and the threat of foreclosure.
To date, there has been no comprehensive theoretical analysis of the role that competition plays on the incentives for vertical integration and its social desirability. This paper provides such an analysis. In so doing, our primary task is to provide a model capable of studying the pure effect of an increase in competition. Thus we need to consider an environment where competition does not otherwise change total resources, technical productivity in the industry or the nature of bargaining in an ad hoc manner. To this end, we consider an environment where there are two downstream and two upstream assets. Upstream competition is modeled as a situation where the two upstream assets are separately owned, whereas under upstream monopoly they are commonly owned.
Our main modeling contribution, however, lies in the game we use to model bargaining between upstream and downstream firms over input supply. We consider an environment, common in the property rights approach to firm boundaries (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) , where the manager of each asset has asset-specific skills, and integration decisions -i.e., the ownership of assets -are made prior to bargaining over the supply of inputs. This set-up allows us to consider the bargaining effects of vertical integration in a similar manner to the standard property rights literature.
In particular, in our environment, integration does not remove the potential for the manager of an acquired firm to accrue rents. This is true both for a firm integrating vertically but also for an upstream monopoly where one upstream asset is owned by the manager of the other. Thus, we can capture the full effects of integration on bargaining relations in the industry. Moreover, in so doing, we are able to investigate new issues in strategic vertical integration; namely, the potential differences between forward and backwards integration.
Bargaining takes a non-cooperative form with each upstream-downstream pair negotiating sequentially over the quantity supplied and the non-linear price between them. Irrevocable breakdowns in negotiations between any upstream and downstream firm constitute a "material change in circumstances" as specified in many contracts, and thereby trigger renegotiations of any previously agreed upon supply contracts. Thus supply arrangements are non-binding in the sense considered by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) for employment contracts. Here, we interpret the non-binding nature of agreements as indicative of a difficulty in writing long-term contracts relative to decisions regarding firm structure. We demonstrate that the distribution of the surplus from this type of bargaining is similar to that arising from the Shapley value concept in cooperative game theory. At the same time, this type of bargaining leads naturally to some of the inefficiencies emphasized in the contracting externalities literature: an upstream supplier with more than one buyer downstream oversupplies the market, because they cannot commit not to impose negative externalities on one buyer by selling large quantities to the other buyer. 2 We demonstrate that vertical integration has two potential effects. First, the bargaining position of all agents changes. Second, some contracting externalities are internalized. To demonstrate the first, we initially consider an environment where downstream assets are in different markets so that there are no competitive externalities between them (Section 3). There vertical integration changes only the distribution of bargaining power and not the surplus generated. We show that vertical integration can increase the sum of payoffs for the integrating parties because it improves their bargaining position in negotiations with independent firms; specifically, it eliminates the possibility of market structures that may be favourable to independents.
Importantly, we demonstrate that there is a greater incentive for vertical integration under upstream competition than under monopoly. This is because the bargaining benefits come from the redistribution of rents from non-integrating parties; and in a monopoly, the non-integrating parties already have low rents. Thus, competition enhances rather than reduces the potential for purely strategic vertical integration.
Moreover, we find that integration occurs from the more competitive segment into the less competitive segment: for example, forward integration is chosen over backward integration only when upstream firms are closer substitutes than downstream firms.
When competitive externalities downstream are taken into account, there is an additional incentive for vertical integration: integration can internalize those externalities and lead to some degree of monopolization in the industry. The integrated upstream firm, when dealing with the non-integrated downstream firm, will internalize the effect of its supply on its own downstream firm. Vertical integration of an upstream monopolist leads to higher industry profits than are possible under upstream competition, raising the returns to integration under upstream monopoly relative to upstream competition and mitigating the returns identified earlier that were based purely on bargaining. Indeed, we demonstrate that in some situations, industry profits may fall (along with consumer surplus) as a result of vertical integration under upstream competition.
In this environment, we identify product differentiation as a key parameter driving incentives to vertically integrate. In particular, we find that when product differentiation is low (high), backward integration is more (less) privately profitable than forward integration. Importantly, while the conventional concern about vertical integration is confirmed when downstream products are relatively homogeneous, the incentive for such integration will be higher from upstream competition than upstream monopoly if products are relatively differentiated. Both these results suggest that the conventional approach of examining the market power of the acquiring firm will not necessarily allow one to draw a conclusion as to whether vertical integration is anti-competitive or not.
The paper that is closest to our own is that of Hart and Tirole (1990) -hereafter, HT. That paper is the first to identify the bargaining and monopolization effects that arise from vertical integration.
3 While their paper identifies these using three separate variants -each with extreme assumptions regarding downstream demand and upstream costsour model nests all of those variants within a single model that allows for more general downstream and upstream environments; in particular, we allow for downstream product differentiation that is identified as an important driver of incentives for integration. 4 Thus, one contribution of our paper is to demonstrate the robustness of HT's results. 5 Nonetheless, we identify subtle differences between our conclusions and theirs throughout. For instance, as in HT, we demonstrate that in some cases vertical integration may lead to a situation where there is foreclosure in input supply to the non-integrated downstream firm. However, in our model, this does not necessarily imply there is foreclosure in payments to that firm, as the integrated firm is interested in preserving supply to that firm as an option if bargaining with its internal manager were to break down.
Significantly, however, HT's model is not equipped to properly examine the questions that motivate us here. First, they assume that upstream and downstream firms simply share the surplus arising from a negotiation according to a fixed parameter, rather than model the drivers of bargaining power-in particular, the asset-specific skills that confer bargaining power in the property rights literature. 6 Consequently, there is no 3 Bolton and Whinston (1993) also identify a bargaining effect from vertical integration. Their model, however, does not have downstream firms directly competing, focusing instead of the impact of bargaining on investment incentives. Their analysis is complementary with that here although, like HT, it is formulated in a special manner to remove any distinction between forward and backward integration. 4 A recent paper by Chemla (2002) also nests a bargaining and monopolization effect. He demonstrates that an upstream monopolist may expend resources to encourage entry by downstream firms so as to limit their bargaining power. He demonstrates that vertical integration will have the dual effect of reducing the monopolist's need to expend those resources and also lead to higher industry profits. de Fontenay and Gans (1999) similarly demonstrate that vertical integration can lead to reduced downstream entry and higher industry profits, but do so using a bargaining framework similar to that considered in this paper, although without an incomplete-contracts perspective on the effect of integration. The current paper does not study the effect of changes in bargaining power the entry decisions of firms, but focuses its attention on the effect of upstream competition. 5 Many of HT's results rely on integration precipitating exit of an upstream or downstream firm. We demonstrate similar bargaining and monopolization effects to HT but without the use of the exit device that drove many of their results. 6 Other papers in the literature avoid the need to model the drivers of bargaining power by assuming that distinction between forward and backward integration. In contrast, in our model, the bargaining position of each firm is driven by their roles in possible market structures that arise following breakdowns in individual negotiations. As forward and backwards integration have different implications as to what market structures are feasible, there will be a difference in the incentives and impact of each.
Second, their analysis of the impact of upstream competition is limited to an analysis of the efficiency of the weaker upstream firm. That is, they consider what happens to the incentives to vertically integrate as the weaker upstream firm becomes more efficient, which confounds the effect of market power and the effect of superior productivity. Our analysis of the impact of upstream competition models competition as the horizontal integration of both upstream assets. And as such, it explicitly considers the impact of vertical integration on internal arrangements within the upstream monopoly.
In terms of its bargaining game, the paper has several antecedents. Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) were the first to focus on Shapley values as likely outcomes of the bargaining game between firms. Variants of the bargaining game developed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) have been applied to bargaining between firms over variable quantities by de Fontenay and Gans (1999) , Inderst and Wey (2002) and Björnerstedt and Stennek (2001) . 7 Note that contracting externalities are ruled out in all of the above game structures: the first rules it out axiomatically, while the latter two consider environments in which downstream players impose no externalities on each other. Here instead we allow sequential contracting in an environment in which downstream players are in the same market, leading to contract externalities as explored elsewhere in the literature on vertical integration.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up our basic model and, in particular, the non-cooperative bargaining game that is capable of assessing the impact of upstream competition on the incentives for vertical integration. Sections 3 and 4 then provide analyses of the no externalities and competitive externalities cases when one vertical merger is possible. Section 5 then considers incentives for a second merger and the question of whether bandwagoning can occur (that is, whether a first merger can increase the incentives for a second one). A final section concludes.
Model Set-Up
We examine an industry that has two upstream and two downstream assets. The upstream assets produce inputs that are used by downstream assets to make final goods.
Inputs from at least one upstream asset are necessary for valuable production downstream. In addition, associated with each asset is a manager endowed with assetspecific human capital that is in turn necessary to generate valuable goods and services from that asset. 
Timeline
The timeline for our model is as follows:
Ownership of assets is determined among all four managers. STAGE 1 (Bargaining): Productivity parameters are revealed and bargaining over input supply terms takes place. STAGE 2 (Production): Production takes place and payoffs are realized.
The asset allocation process is not modeled with a fully specified endogenous process. 9 Instead, we focus on more limited, partial incentives, including whether integration is jointly profitable for the merging parties. 10 The stage that requires further elaboration is the bargaining stage and we turn now to discuss that in detail. 1993 and Hart, 1995) . 9 Some papers do consider such issues; including Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) . However, the externalities involved in asset allocation make a complete modeling of this process work fit for a separate paper. For an exploration of such issues see Gans (2001) . 10 We do not explicitly model any efficiency cost to integration. This could involve a straight resource costs (as in HT) or alternatively investment incentive effects (as in Hart and Moore, 1990; Bolton and Whinston, 1993) . For the remainder of this paper, we simply compare the profitability of integration under different market structures, supposing that the most profitable opportunities of integration are the least likely to be outweighed by the cost of lost resources or investment.
Bargaining
Upstream and downstream firms can reach supply agreements specifying nonlinear prices. Without loss of generality, we examine bargaining over supply from U j to D i specifying a quantity, q ij , and lump-sum transfer, ij p % paid by i to j. No other contracts, in particular no contingent contracts, can be written. When bargaining takes place internally, quantity is not relevant and the focus of negotiations is over the size of any transfer payment, ij t % paid by j to manager i for i's participation in the production process.
Our bargaining game is basically an extension of the wage bargaining model of Stole and Zwiebel (1996) -hereafter SZ -to the case of vertical supply agreements.
Bargaining is pairwise, vertical (occurring between managers of individual upstream and downstream assets), and sequential (only one pair of agents bargain at a time). The order in which pairs bargain in every situation, or the probability of each order, is common knowledge. Each pair of negotiators make sequential offers to each other until they reach an agreement, and after an offer is rejected there is an infinitesimally small probability of an irrevocable breakdown in negotiations. Binmore Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) have proven that a pair bargaining in this fashion will agree on the Nash bargaining solution. Therefore, each pair splits the surplus resulting from an agreement relative to their expected payoffs in any renegotiation subgame that might be triggered by a disagreement.
Each pair signs a contract, but the contract is void if any subsequent bargain breaks down. The idea is that any breakdown in negotiations would radically change the supply configuration, allowing firms to invoke a clause in their contract calling for complete renegotiation after a "material change in circumstances." In other words, we are envisaging a short-run price formation process rather than negotiations over long-term supply contracts. This is an appropriate structure in environments in which price contracts are renegotiated more frequently than the market structure changes.
The key difference between our environment and SZ's is that input supply quantities are potentially variable and there is competition on both sides of the market.
Their model had a single firm bargaining with many workers, each of whom supplied an indivisible unit of labor. While, as we demonstrate below, SZ's broad outcomes translate naturally to an environment without externalities (specifically, they provide a noncooperative foundation for the Shapley value), the presence of externalities provides some complications that we outline in more detail below. Because we assume that no contingent contracts can be written, subgame perfection implies that all players take disagreement payoffs as given in their current negotiations. Because a breakdown in negotiations is irrevocable, after a breakdown the game will never return to the current "node of the game," the set of negotiations currently underway; therefore agents cannot credibly choose a post-breakdown strategy that will improve their payoff in the current negotiations. Instead, after a breakdown they will follow the strategy that maximizes payoffs in post-breakdown negotiations.
When upstream and downstream firms are integrated -that is, their assets have a common owner -the owner negotiates over the transfer payment with the manager of each integrated asset, and the suppliers/supplies of an integrated asset negotiate with the owner. Again, the order of negotiations is common knowledge.
A final critical point to note is that the bargaining game is one of incomplete information. In particular, agents are not aware of prices and quantities agreed upon in other negotiations that they did not participate in. . This may arise if downstream firms sell distinct products using a similar set of inputs, sell products in different geographical markets, or sell highly differentiated products. 14 As will be demonstrated, this case allows us to isolate the impact of vertical integration on each agent's bargaining position -holding efficiency considerations as fixed -and provide a basis for comparing the effects of upstream competition in this regard.
Non-Integration
To build intuition, we first examine the case of non-integration when there is upstream competition. Under non-integration, all four assets are separately owned by their respective managers, who can potentially negotiate with any vertically related manager. As we will see, this is not the case under integration. The proof is in the appendix. Notice that this result is independent of the precise ordering of pairs in sequential negotiations.
The intuition for efficiency is subtle, given the interactions between the negotiations of each pair of agents. As depicted in Figure 2 A A p q % to maximize:
where ij Φ and ji Φ represent the payoffs D i and U j expect to receive in the renegotiation subgame triggered by a breakdown in their negotiations; by subgame perfection, these are taken as given. The remaining pricing terms either form the subject of a previous agreement earlier in the bargaining sequence (in which case their terms are given by the assumption of passive beliefs) or anticipate the negotiations of pairs further in the sequence. In that case, we can demonstrate that when anticipated outcomes are substituted into (1), the only term involving 1A q , taking into account the envelope theorem, is a linear function of 1 1 1
q is always chosen to maximize industry profits.
In terms of distribution, the equilibrium payoffs in Table 1 based on sequential rather than simultaneous bargaining. Second, given this, we do not require supply agreements to specify pricing arrangements that would arise for every industry configuration. For example, Inderst and Wey (2002) require price and quantity agreements to be arrived at for every possible series of breakdowns that may emerge. In contrast, we do not allow negotiating agents to commit to supply arrangements contingent on the exit or severing of any supply relationship in the industry.
Vertical Integration
Vertical integration involves a change in asset ownership between an upstream and a downstream manager. We will focus here on vertical integration between U A and Nonetheless, in this environment, it can be demonstrated -along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 1 -that integration (BI or FI) will only impact upon the distribution of surplus between agents and not on the overall surplus generated. As in non-integration, this occurs because, under passive beliefs, each negotiating pair chooses its respective quantity in a way that does not impact on the pricing and quantity terms of other negotiations. Thus, the supply quantities chosen continue to maximize industry profits.
Each agent's payoffs change, however. Those payoffs are contained in Table 1 .
The critical feature to note about the effects of integration is that it rules out the participation of an asset's manager from a coalition that does not include the owner.
When U A owns D 1 (that is, forward integration FI), the payoff
, and the payoff
In each case, integration diminishes the bargaining position of one or both of the non-integrated firms and, as is depicted in the last two rows of Table 1 , this raises U A and D 1 's joint payoff from integration over non-integration by
Comparing these two changes in payoff, notice that FI will be chosen over BI if and only if
That is, FI is favoured as an instrument for improving joint bargaining power precisely when upstream firms are closer substitutes than downstream firms. 17 In other words, the acquiring firm comes from the more competitive vertical segment. This is precisely because integration eliminates an option for the acquirer's competitor, an option that is valuable precisely because firms in the other vertical segment are not close substitutes (and therefore that segment is less competitive). For example, forward integration means that U B loses an option to supply both downstream firms and this loss is costly when supplying both is relatively valuable.
Consequently, the non-integrating firm that suffers the greatest harm from integration is the firm that is in the same segment as the acquiring firm (i. 
Upstream Monopoly
As the focus of this paper is the change in the effect of vertical integration as upstream competition is introduced, we need to take care in specifying the upstream monopoly case. 20 In particular, we require the set of productive assets in the industry to be the same between the two cases as well as the characteristics of any human capital. This means that we cannot simply take the two upstream assets and combine them under a single owner, as one of the assets will be managed by an individual with important human capital. As with vertical integration, that agent cannot be replaced and so will have some bargaining power in negotiations with the owner of upstream assets.
The only difference between the outcomes under upstream monopoly as compared with upstream competition is in the distribution of the surplus between agents.
Industry profits are maximized under the same logic as Proposition 1 and these profits are the same as under upstream competition, as the characteristics of resources in the industry are unchanged. In contrast, the payoffs of individual agents -listed in Table 1 
Comparison of Upstream Competition and Upstream Monopoly
We are now in a position to compare the incentives for vertical integration in upstream monopoly with those for upstream competition, based on pure bargaining effects. Recall that the payoff to FI relative to BI is determined by the same condition in upstream monopoly and upstream competition; so we can look at FI and BI in turn, using the results in 
Competitive Externalities
The previous section demonstrates that incentives for strategic vertical integration can be higher under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. In the no externalities case, however, total surplus is unchanged following integration; industry profits are always maximized. However, integration altered the distribution of surplus in ways that were different, depending up the degree of upstream competition. When there are competitive externalities, the distributional (or bargaining) consequences of vertical integration are largely preserved. What differs is the level of total profits and therefore, integration has welfare consequences. As we demonstrate in this section, vertical integration can lead to higher downstream prices and increased deadweight losses, as in the contracting externalities literature. Critically, however, the industry profits generated by vertical integration differ between upstream competition and monopoly. In this section, we explore how the presence of upstream competition impacts upon the extent any welfare losses from integration.
Total Surplus
The contracting externalities literature typically considers a monopolist selling to downstream firms producing identical goods. 23 The monopolist makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to each firm in turn. If it were to sell the profit-maximizing quantity to the first, it would have an incentive to "secretly discount" (i.e., sell more than the profit-maximizing quantity, at a discount) for other downstream firms, as those later offers would not internalize any externality imposed on contracts already signed. 
Proposition 3 provides a sharp characterization of the outcomes in an environment where upstream competition is very strong (as upstream inputs are perfectly substitutable from the point of view of downstream firms). The concavity of upstream cost isoquants means that it is cost minimizing for each upstream firm to supply a single downstream firm, under non-integration as well as integration. 26 In the presence of upstream competition, therefore, all integration does is select who will supply whom, without changing the actual surplus generated. 27 This leads to the interesting result that if a dedicated supply flow is optimal, there is no change in industry profits following integration (Result (i)).
26 Proposition 2 demonstrates that cost minimization is achieved in equilibrium. 27 HT's ex post monopolization case similarly found that there was no increase in industry profits following integration. This was because their case is a special case of Proposition 3 with linear isoquants. 
Distribution
In solving for the equilibrium payoffs under competitive externalities, there arises the important issue of what SZ term 'feasibility.' An equilibrium is feasible if there is no incentive for an individual party to precipitate a breakdown in any negotiating pair at any stage (i.e., in any market structure that might have emerged). Under competitive externalities feasibility cannot be guaranteed.
To see this, consider a situation where a single upstream firm, U A , is negotiating with two non-integrated downstream firms. If both negotiating pairs agree then they 30 Defined as the unweighted sum of consumer surplus generated from both downstream products. ( ) For the remainder of this paper, we will assume that the feasibility conditions hold regardless of the level of integration. Nonetheless, in the appendix, we provide the full conditions for feasibility to hold in our model (including our running example). Table 2 . Table 2 
Given feasibility, we can demonstrate the following: Proposition 4. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs, each firm receives the payoffs listed in

The payoffs in
Comparing Incentives for FI and BI
In Section 3, we asked whether the acquiring firm in vertical integration would come from the more or less competitive vertical segment. From Table 2 , we can see that FI will be preferred to BI, under either upstream competition or monopoly, if and only if
. This corresponds to the comparison made for the no externalities case except that here the left hand side takes into account the fact that when downstream outputs are substitutes in the eyes of consumers, industry profits will be lower as a result of their competition. Indeed, the more substitutable are downstream outputs in the eyes of consumers (intensifying Cournot competition under nonintegration), the more likely it is that a downstream firm will acquire upstream assets.
Hence, our conclusion that the acquirer will come from the more competitive vertical segment is strengthened when there are competitive externalities.
Comparing Upstream Competition and Monopoly
The central question being considered in this paper is whether it is indeed the case that there is more incentive for vertical integration when there is upstream monopoly rather than upstream competition. When there are no competitive externalities, we concluded that due to pure bargaining effects, the greatest potential for purely strategic vertical integration arose under upstream competition than upstream monopoly.
When there are competitive externalities, vertical integration involves a monopolization effect and consequent welfare harm. In the special case of Proposition 3, this effect was stronger when there was a vertically integrated upstream monopolist rather than an upstream competitor. Nonetheless, using 
The left hand side of the inequality in the proposition comes from the fact that the bargaining effect from vertical integration is stronger under upstream competition than monopoly. On the other hand, an upstream monopoly is able to use vertical integration more effectively to increase industry profits; thus, the monopolization effect weakens the relative incentives of an upstream competitor to vertically integrate.
Propositions 3 and 5 demonstrate that if downstream firms sell perfectly substitutable products, the conventional wisdom regarding the impact of upstream competition on the incentive to integrate is likely (although not guaranteed) to hold. In that case, the left hand side of the inequality in Proposition 5 is at its lowest while the right hand-side is at its highest possible level; as the upstream monopolist can achieve an industry monopoly outcome when it integrates while under upstream competition, integration leaves industry profits unchanged.
Nonetheless, as downstream products become less substitutable, it is likely that the reverse will be the case. Indeed, we know (from Section 3) that in the extremewhere downstream firms operate in separate markets -there is a greater incentive to integrate under upstream competition. This suggests that as the degree of downstream product differentiation becomes sufficiently high, the conventional wisdom will be overturned. For our running example we can demonstrate that this is indeed the case.
EXAMPLE (Continued): Figure 5 illustrates the difference between the incentives for vertical integration under upstream competition less those under upstream monopoly.
Note that the lower the degree of product differentiation, the lower is the relative incentive under upstream competition. 
Integration and Foreclosure
It is worth emphasizing that the foreclosure effects of integration on nonintegrated firms differ in a subtle but important way from previous studies. 
Bandwagon Effects
An important issue in studies of vertical integration (Chandler, 1964 and Scherer, 1980 ) is whether vertical integration by one set of firms in an industry might enhance incentives for other firms to integrate. That is, is there a bandwagon effect associated with vertical integration?
The literature is divided on this issue. Some researchers examining the possibility of vertical foreclosure have constructed models whereby vertical integration reduces incentives for further integration. For instance, Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) argue that initial integration is driven by competition for assets and the negative externality of integration on non-integrated firms, something not present for later integration choices.
Choi and Yi (2000) Under upstream competition, so long as U B is not too inefficient, U B receives a payment from D 1 (or the integrated firm) so as it improve its bargaining position in the event of an internal breakdown. However, it always receives a payment from D 2 . Hence, even with FI, U B may not wish to exit the industry. 34 As before, we need to make an assumption as to what would happen if negotiations broke down between the downstream unit of one firm and the other integrated firm. Analogous to our earlier assumption, we assume that in this case, no negotiations between the two firms would be possible -that is, the downstream unit of the other firm would not be able to purchase inputs outside their firm.
only serve to further monopolize the market, and then only in the case where downstream products are not perfect substitutes (by Proposition 3).
Turning to the upstream competition case, the payoffs following a second merger are as in Thus, the return to integration does not depend on prior integration.
When there is an impact on total profits from integration, note that FI is more likely to generate a bandwagon effect than BI. However, it is possible that integration could reduce industry profits. In this case, an initial merger may reduce the incentives for a second merger. 35 The payoffs in Table 3 are calculated using the same procedure as in Table 2 (as documented in the proof of Proposition 4). The remainder of the proposition comes from a direct comparison of the increase in payoff to U B and D 2 if they merged second compared with the same increase if they merged first. These calculations do presume that a first merger would not be followed by a second one. If a second merger was expected (that is a merger by U A and D 1 would occur regardless), then they would be indifferent between being the first or second to merge. In both the upstream competition and monopoly cases, the primary driving force for a bandwagon merger is whether that merger could achieve a greater increment to industry profit than the initial merger. Given the usual concavity assumptions on firm profits, a further reduction in quantity produced in the industry following a second merger will not generate this additional incentive. Hence, there will often be a greater payoff to the initial merging parties than subsequent ones.
EXAMPLE (Continued): In our running example, Figure 6(a) and (b) illustrates the size of the bandwagon effect both BI and FI respectively. The graphs assume that downstream
Conclusions
This paper has sorted out alternative claims regarding the impact of upstream competition on the incentives and consequences for vertical integration. While vertical integration that occurs when there is an upstream monopoly has the greatest potential to cause higher prices and lower consumer welfare, this need not translate into greater incentives for purely strategic vertical integration. Specifically, those incentives may be higher when there is upstream competition (especially if downstream competition is not too intense) and may be higher for backward integration (from the competitive into the monopolistic segment) than for forward integration (akin to the more conventional γ γ picture of an acquiring monopolistic firm).
In terms of competition and anti-trust analysis, our results support the notion that proposed vertical mergers involving a monopoly bottleneck are of greater concern than where there is upstream competition. Nonetheless, in terms of policies designed to restructure industries and encourage upstream competition (such as those that have occurred in cable television and telecommunications), the potential gains associated with these moves may be mitigated as it could encourage greater strategic vertical integration.
Nonetheless, while our model has synthesized and generalized existing models in the strategic vertical integration literature -as well as providing a framework linking these to models in the property rights literature -there are many possible extensions. In particular, moving beyond the simple 2 by 2 case would be useful. This could be by expanding the number of upstream and downstream assets as well as deepening the vertical chain of production. This would allow a mapping between our work and the work of Hendricks and McAfee (2000) who provide a means of linking concentration measures and integration in vertical segments with the potential for anticompetitive harm from a merger. Their work is based on a mechanism design approach to vertical relations whereas ours uses a non-cooperative bargaining model. This would also provide a means of dealing more carefully with the impact of vertical integration on entry.
Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 4:
Take a given sequence of negotiations. The first negotiating pair, bargaining in an alternating offer format, offer a price and a quantity to each other with an exogenous risk of breakdown following any non-accepted offer. This is the format of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) and they demonstrate that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this bargaining game is the Nash bargaining solution. For example, between D i and U j , the bargaining solution will be the solution to the following problem: 
Under passive beliefs, the outcomes of any agreement in this bargaining game will not impact on the negotiating parties expectations of agreements that will be reached in any subsequent negotiation (that is, p ij and q ij are taken as given for any negotiation not involves both D i and U j ). Hence, price in each negotiating pair will be determined by equations (2) to (5). The first order condition for quantity will be:
(substituting equations (2) externalities and quantities can be renegotiated in any breakdown subgame, under passive beliefs, these are the only terms in industry profits containing q ij ; hence, if all negotiating pairs choose their respective quantities to maximize joint profits, by our concavity assumptions, industry profits will be maximized. This establishes efficiency for the no externality case (Proposition 1).
When there are competitive externalities, each pair chooses a quantity that maximizes joint profits taking the quantities chosen in other pairs as given. However, these quantities are chosen in a manner that equates marginal downstream profit to marginal upstream cost. Note that if instead downstream firms chose their quantities based on a per unit upstream price, say ij ρ , they would choose their quantities to satisfy For distribution, given passive beliefs, in the initial subgame, there are four bargaining pairs, the pricing outcomes of which are described by the following equations. 
Notice that there is a change in negotiating pairs relative to the non-integrated case. U A negotiates a supply agreement with U B for the supply of inputs to D 1 . This is because the residual control rights of the downstream asset have been transferred to U A . Again, solving these equations recursively, including the payoffs of each renegotiation subgame, allows us to derive the equilibrium payoffs of each firm as in Table 2 (Proposition 4).
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that (10) and (11) Under upstream monopoly (ii), with vertical integration, equilibrium quantities are determined by: 
If (14) and (15) (14) and (15) (16) and (17) (14) and (16) 
Appendix B: Feasibility Conditions
In this appendix, we provide explicitly, the conditions for our solution in Table 2 to be feasible. However, we do this for the special case where both upstream and both downstream firms are symmetric. While this simplifies notation, it is not an innocuous assumption. Indeed, it is precisely where one firm is far more productive than another that feasibility may breakdown. Thus, our purpose here is to give a feel for the conditions rather than a comprehensive treatment.
For the symmetric case, under non-integration, feasibility requires the following three inequalities be satisfied: 
Π is equilibrium industry profits where one downstream-upstream pair cannot trade with one another. Natural sufficient conditions for these to be satisfied are that
Notice that these collapse to When integration occurs, the feasibility conditions will be contingent upon whether there is forward or backwards integration. In this case, however, we can gather further information from the fact that integration is possible; namely, that the acquired firm still operates and hence, their payoffs must be feasible. So if U A took over D 1 , then an agreement with D 1 will be presumed to be feasible. This means that it must be the case that:
Under symmetry, in addition to conditions under non-integration, the following conditions are required for feasibility:
For the case the perfect substitutes upstream and downstream, these reduce to:
(a weaker condition than that for non-integration). 
